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RETICENT REVOLUTION: PROSPECTS FOR DAMAGE
SUITS UNDER THE NEW MEXICO BILL OF RIGHTS
PAUL R. OWEN*

I. INTRODUCTION
On January 21, 1911, the territorial legislature ratified the constitution
for the new state of New Mexico.' In article II, the constitution laid
out the New Mexico bill of rights, codifying twenty-three basic principles
as diverse as religious freedom, 2 free elections, 3 and the rights guaranteed
by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 4 In its present form, the constitution retains all of the original sections of the bill of rights5 and
discrimination based
has only two significant additions, which prohibit
6
on gender and recognize crime victims' rights.

The authority of the state constitution in matters such as criminal
procedure7 and annexations of property by the state" has never been

questioned. Nevertheless, a review of New Mexico case law reveals a
dearth of precedent providing compensation for the infringement of a
right guaranteed by the state constitution. With the exception of the
"takirrgs" clause found in section 20, 9 no part of the bill of rights
provides for monetary damages to compensate for the infringement of
a right guaranteed by the New Mexico Constitution. No such provision
was considered by the Constitutional Conventions in 191010 or 1967.11

*

Mr. Owen is an associate attorney with the law firm of Campbell, Carr & Berge, P.A.,

Santa Fe, New Mexico. He previously served as a judicial law clerk to Judge Lynn Pickard, New
Mexico Court of Appeals, Santa Fe, New Mexico, 1994-95; J.D., University of New Mexico School
of Law, 1994; B.A., Texas Christian University, 1990. Admitted to the New Mexico bar, October
1994.
I. Annotated Constitution and Enabling Act of the State of New Mexico (on file with the
University of New Mexico School of Law Library).
2. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 11.
3. N.M. CONST. art. 11, § 8.
4. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 5.
5. N.M. CONST. art. i, §§ 1-23.
6. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18 (as amended Nov. 7, 1972), § 24 (adopted Nov. 3, 1992).
7. See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 435, 863 P.2d 1052, 1056 (1993) (finding that
the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule is incompatible with the New Mexico Constitution's
article II, section 10 (search and seizure provision)).
8. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Farrar, 102 N.M. 739, 700 P.2d 642 (1985). Because
article I, section 20 of the constitution explicitly provides for compensation for property taken by
the government, cases based on that article will not be discussed in this article.
9. "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 20.
10. Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the Proposed State of New Mexico, PRESS
OF THE MORNING JOURNAL (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1910 (on file with the University of New Mexico
School of Law Library).
II. CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF NEw MEXICO OF 1967 (on file with the University of New Mexico School of Law

Library).
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Despite the much-heralded 'constitutional revolution' in the judicial
' 12
interpretation of individual rights provisions since the early 1970s,
New Mexico litigants, it seems, have not found a new avenue for
recovering monetary damages.
This article first examines existing New Mexico statutory and case
law, specifically addressing the unique situation of sovereign immunity
in New Mexico and how it might relate to implied constitutional causes
of action. The article then addresses federal and other states' approaches
to implied constitutional rights of action. This analysis emphasizes the
different jurisdictions' rationales for accepting or rejecting an implied
cause of action. Finally, this article explores the potential treatment
of claims for damages for violations of the New Mexico Bill of Rights.
II.

EXISTING NEW MEXICO LAW

In order to determine how New Mexico should approach the issue
of fashioning a damages remedy for violations of the state constitution,
an examination of the current state of New Mexico law is necessary.
Such an examination includes New Mexico statutory law, federal case
law discussing the New Mexico Bill of Rights, and New Mexico case
law.
New Mexico Human Rights Act
New Mexico has no statute specifically authorizing suits for damages
for violations of the New Mexico bill of rights. The only existing statute
providing redress for actions which might otherwise be actionable under
the New Mexico Constitution is the New Mexico Human Rights Act. 3
The Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination based on "race, age,
color, religion, national origin, ancestry, sex and physical or mental
handicap"''
in numerous situations, ranging from employment" to
housing.16 If a complainant follows the proper administrative procedures
and subsequently prevails in the suit, the
court can award damages for
7
violations of the Human Rights Act.'
The Human Rights Act does not include language recognizing a right
to sue for violations of the New Mexico Constitution independent of
the discrimination expressed in the Act. Consequently, a litigant seeking
monetary redress for violations of his state constitutional rights other
than discrimination lacks a statutory mechanism . 8
A.

12. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (1993).
13. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-1 to 28-1-15 (Repl. Pamp. 1992, & Supp. 1993).
14. § 28-1-7(B).
15. § 28-1-7(B).
16. § 21-1-7(G).
17. §§ 28-1-10 to 21-1-11. See also Smith v. FDC Corp., 109 N.M. 514, 787 P.2d 433 (1990)
(affirming award of damages for violation of Human Rights Act); Jaramillo v. J.C. Penney Co.,.
102 N.M. 272, 694 P.2d 528 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that litigant must comply with administrative
procedures of Human Rights Act prior to commencing suit for violations of the Act).
18. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1989) (providing a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity for violation of state constitutional rights, thus seemingly providing a monetary remedy
when law enforcement officers are the perpetrators).
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B.

The Tort Claims Act
Sovereign immunity represents a major barrier to the recognition of
an implied cause of action. Under sovereign immunity in New Mexico,
the state and persons acting under color of state law are immune from
tort liability except as specifically provided by the Tort Claims Act
(the "Act"). 9 That act was created in response to the New Mexico
Supreme 0Court's wholesale abolishment of sovereign immunity in Hicks
2
v. State.
The plaintiff in Hicks brought suit against the state highway department for negligence in maintaining a bridge, seeking damages for
the death of his wife and minor son. 2' The court examined the history
of sovereign immunity in general and in New Mexico and concluded
that it was a common law doctrine that had become antiquated and
22 Consequently, the court abolished sovereign immunity
anachronistic.
23
in all cases.
The legislature responded immediately to Hicks by enacting the Tort
Claims Act. 24 The Act reinstated sovereign immunity for any governmental entity and any public employee for all torts except as specifically
25
waived by the Act.
The constitutionality of the Act was subsequently upheld in Ferguson
v. New Mexico State Highway Commission.26 The Ferguson court considered the unique problem posed by the abolition of common law
sovereign immunity in Hicks and its subsequent revival by the legislature.
The Fergusons claimed that the legislature had acted beyond its authority
by overruling Hicks.27 The Ferguson court disagreed, stating that:
[tihe legislature acted well within its authority in abrogating the
common law to the extent provided for in the Act. It substituted
statutory partial immunity for common law total immunity and the
court's denial of any immunity. Court decisions may be modified
by legislative enactment in any manner and to any degree decided
by the legislature, 28so long as the legislation conforms to constitutional standards.
The Ferguson court held that the Act does not deny equal protection
despite the fact that a plaintiff injured by a government officer may

19. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989), provides that:
[a] governmental entity and any public employee while acting within the scope of
duty are granted immunity from liability for any tort except as waived by Sections
41-4-5 through 41-4-12 NMSA 1978. Waiver of this immunity shall be limited to
and governed by the provisions of Sections 41-4-13 through 41-4-25 NMSA 1978.
20. 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975).
21. Id. at 588, 544 P.2d at 1153.
22. Id.
23. Id.at 590-92' 544 P.2d at 1155-57.
24. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-1 to 41-4-29 (Repl. Pamp. 1989 & Cum. Supp. 1993).
25. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989). See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-5 to -25,
which set forth the waivers of sovereign immunity.
26. 99 N.M. 194, 656 P.2d 244 (Ct. App. 1982).
27. Id. at 195, 656 P.2d at 245.
28. Id.
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not have the same right to sue as a plaintiff injured by a private
citizen. 29 Thus, the court concluded that because the legislature's reinstatement of sovereign immunity was within its power and the Act
does not deny equal protection, the Act is a valid revival of sovereign
immunity. 0
Although the legislature's treatment of causes of action against the
state for traditional torts is reasonably clear, ambiguity remains with
regard to injuries which are not commonly recognized as torts. Accordingly, the Tort Claims Act's assertion of immunity for torts3 '
becomes ambiguous when applied to violations of state constitutional
rights. Arguably, a deprivation of a constitutional right is not a tort;
a right is created by the constitution and a corresponding duty not to
infringe upon that right is imposed upon the government.3 2 Because
Hicks abolished sovereign immunity generally and the legislature reasserted it only for torts, it is arguable that there is no immunity for
violations of state constitutional rights.
The flaw in this argument becomes clear, however, upon recognition
that the legislature did specifically mention state constitutional violations
in two sections of the Tort Claims Act. Indeed, section 41-4-4(D)(2)
of the Act mandates that a governmental entity must pay any damage
award assessed against a government employee acting within the scope
of his employment if that award was a result of a violation of rights
secured by the New Mexico Constitution. Nevertheless, the Act fails
to detail the specific causes of action which are appropriate to state
a claim for the "violation of rights" noted in section 41-4-4 (D)(2).
A cogent analysis becomes more difficult when considering the damage
award provision3 3 in conjunction with section 41-4-12. That section
specifically waives immunity of law enforcement officers for violations
of "any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution
and laws of .. . New Mexico .

. . ."

In comparing these two sections,

it would seem that the state would be immune from liability for a
violation of a state constitutional right unless it was a law enforcement
officer who had committed the violation.
The importance of the legislature's mention of state constitutional
violations twice in the Act was noted by the court of appeals in Begay
v. State.3 4 The court noted that the provisions of sections 41-4-4(D)(2)
and 41-4-12 indicated the intention of the legislature to include state

29. Id. at 195-96, 656 P.2d at 245-46.
30. Id. As the New Mexico Supreme Court similarly noted in a later case, Hydro Conduit Corp.
v. Kemble, 110 N.M. 173, 177 n.2, 793 P.2d 855, 859 n.2 (1990), "The 'common law' partially
abrogated by the legislature was clearly the common law existing before Hicks. But the common
law now recognizes a constitutionally valid statutory imposition of sovereign immunity, and such
immunity must be honored by the courts where the legislature has so mandated."
31. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
32. See the discussion of Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 479 A.2d 921 (Md. 1984), infra
notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
33. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(D)(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
34. 104 N.M. 483, 723 P.2d 252 (Ct. App. 1986).
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constitutional rights violations in its grant of immunity." In Begay,
the plaintiffs brought suit against the state and the state medical6
investigator for, in part, a violation of their free exercise of religion.1
37
The suit was based on an autopsy performed on the plaintiffs' relative.
On the state constitutional issue, the court ruled:
The state has given no consent to be sued under Article II § 11 of
the New Mexico State Constitution. The Tort Claims Act specifically
includes state constitutional violations committed by public officers
and governmental entities within the torts for which liability may
be found, provided that the violations are committed by an entity
or officer included in the Act's waivers.38
Accordingly, the court found that both the state and the medical
examiner were immune from suit because the Tort Claims Act did not
explicitly waive liability for the state or the medical examiner for
violations of state constitutional rights.3 9 Begay seems to indicate that
the state and all of its officers (except law enforcement officers) are
immune from liability for damage claims based on state constitutional
rights.
C. Federal Cases Discussing The Possibility Of Damages For
Violations Of The New Mexico Bill Of Rights
Courts in the Tenth Circuit have considered claims brought under
the New Mexico bill of rights. They have found classifications that
violate the New Mexico bill of rights and fashioned equitable remedies
accordingly. 40 In suits for damages, the federal courts have not been
consistent, possibly because of the lack of guidance from New Mexico
statutory and case law.
Specifically noting the lack of guidance, the federal district court in
Roybal v. City of Albuquerque4 declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction
over the plaintiff's state equal protection claim because the issue of
whether to allow damages for violations of that clause had not been
43
settled by New Mexico courts. 42 In Lucero v. City of Albuquerque,
the court, presented with a claim for damages based on alleged violations

35. Id. at 487, 723 P.2d at 256.
36. Id. at 485, 723 P.2d at 254.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 488, 723 P.2d at 257.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Robertson v. Regents of University of New Mexico, 350 F. Supp. 100 (D.N.M.
1972) (Statute creating classifications for tuition purposes held violative of the due process and
equal protection clauses of the federal and New Mexico constitutions). Federal courts have not
always considered the New Mexico constitutional claims even when they have been raised in suits
for equitable relief. See, e.g., Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir.
1985), in which claims for damages for violations of the New Mexico constitutional prohibition of
the state establishment of religion and free exercise of religion were raised but not reached by the
court. Id. at 780.
41. 653 F. Supp. 102 (D.N.M. 1986).
42. Id. at 108.
43. 140 F.R.D. 455 (D.N.M. 1992).
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of the New Mexico Constitution's guarantee of the right to associate,
avoided44 discussing the ,merits of the state constitutional claim altogether.
On the other hand, one federal court in this circuit has awarded
damages for violations of the New Mexico bill of rights. In Montes
v. Gallegos, 45 the plaintiffs sued city and county officials based on an
arrest which the plaintiffs claimed violated the New Mexico bill of
rights' guarantee of natural rights, 46 prohibitions against unreasonable
search and seizure 47 and deprivation of property rights without due
process of law. 48 Initially, the court granted summary judgment on the
plaintiff's search and seizure claim. 49 While the court provided its
reasoning for granting summary judgment on the federal search and
seizure claim,5 0 it supplied limited rationale concerning the award for
damages under the state constitution." Subsequently, the court granted
summary judgment on the deprivation of property claim. It held that
because the defendants violated New Mexico trespass law, they had
also violated the New Mexico constitutional protection from deprivation
of property without due process.12 Finally, the court rejected the plaintiff's claim for damages under article II, section 4 of the New Mexico
Constitution, stating that New Mexico courts had "not 'reach[ed] the
issue of whether, and under what circumstances, violation of [article
II, section 4] provisions give rise to a cause of action for damages
'''53

44. Id. at 457.
45. 812 F. Supp. 1165 (D.N.M. 1992).
46. Id. at 1169 (citing N.M. CONST. art. 11,§ 4). N.M. CONST. art. II, § 4 provides:
All persons are born equally free, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable
rights, among which are the rights of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of
acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of seeking and obtaining safety
and happiness.
47. Id. (citing N.M. CoNsT. art. II, § 10).
48. Id. (citing N.M. CoNsT. art. 1I, § 18).
49. Id. at 1170.
50. The court reasoned that because the warrant that the officers were relying upon was facially
invalid, the search of plaintiffs' home and seizure of their persons was in violation of the federal
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1169.
51. Id. at 1170. The only statement as to the violation of the New Mexico Constitution's
prohibition against search and seizure was that "[s]ummary judgment should also be granted in
Maria Montes' favor on her claim under article I, section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution
which protects all New Mexicans from unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. The court did note
that the New Mexico Tort Claims Act provision waives immunity for violations of the New Mexico
Constitution by law enforcement officers. Id. at 1169.
52. Id. at 1170. The court reasoned that
the entry into the home constituted a trespass, as defined by New Mexico case law
and the Restatement (2d). Thus, in deliberately and unlawfully entering the Montes'
home, defendant Pacheco deprived Maria Montes' of her property rights without
due process of law. Plaintiff Maria Montes' motion for summary judgment on her
claims under ... Art. II, Section 18 to the New Mexico Constitution should be
granted.
Id.
53. Id. at 1171 (quoting California First Bank v. State, 11 N.M. 64, 76, 801 P.2d 646, 658
(1990)) (brackets in original) (citation omitted).
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The effect of the Montes holding was to allow the plaintiffs' claims
for damages based on violations of two provisions of the New Mexico
bill of rights while denying a claim based on another. Because all
claims were brought against law enforcement officers, the waiver of
54
sovereign immunity applied to all three state constitutional claims.
The court failed to provide precedent or reasoning for the recognition
of a damages remedy prior to an analysis of the applicability of sovereign
immunity. Accordingly, the schizophrenic decision in Montes provides
little guidance to litigants seeking to recover damages for violations of
the New Mexico bill of rights.
D. New Mexico Case Law
A major impediment to the development of state constitutional law
jurisprudence in New Mexico has been the failure of parties bringing
claims under the New Mexico bill of rights to develop arguments in
support of their positions. As a result, New Mexico courts have refused
to consider those claims." The courts have not ignored the existence
of the state constitutional actions in equity, however. As previously
noted, New Mexico courts have used the state constitution to 7review
criminal procedure5 6 and annexations of property by the state.1

Although attempts to use the New Mexico bill of rights to recover
damages have been few in number, some authority exists to support
implying a cause of action for violations of the state bill of rights. In
Territory of New Mexico v. Taylor,5" the court indicated that an injured
party may recover damages for a violation of his/her state constitutional
rights. The court considered whether an instruction given in a criminal
case correctly stated the law regarding warrantless arrests.59 The court
stated that an officer "must use no more force than the nature of the
case warrants, and if he exceeds such limits then he may be liable for
damages in a civil suit."60 The issue in Taylor was not whether damages
could be awarded, however, and the above language has seen only one
other use.
In a subsequent criminal case, City of Albuquerque v. Patrick, the
defendant sought to overturn a conviction for driving while intoxicated. 6'

54. Id. at 1169. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-12 (Repl. Pamp. 1989 & Cum. Supp. 1993).
55. See, e.g., State v. Sutton, 112 N.M. 449, 816 P.2d 518 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 112 N.M.
308, 815 P.2d 161 (1991) (refraining from considering whether definition of curtilage is broader
under New Mexico search and seizure constitutional provision because issue not argued or briefed);
Futrell v. Ahrens, 88 N.M. 284, 540 P.2d 214 (1975) (natural rights and equal protection claims
not supported by authority, so court declined to find housing classification unconstitutional under
N.M. CONST. art. 11, §§ 4 & 18).
56. See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 863 P.2d 1052 (1993) (finding that the "good
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule is incompatible with the N.M. CONST. art. I1,§ 10 (search
and seizure provision)).
57. See, e.g., Electro-Jet Tool Mfg. v. City of Albuquerque, 114 N.M. 676, 845 P.2d 770 (1992).
58. 11 N.M. 588, 71 P. 489 (1903). Notably, the decision in Taylor pre-dated the New Mexico
Constitution.
59. Id. at 601, 71 P. at 493.
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. 63 N.M. 227, 316 P.2d 243 (1957).

180
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The defendant claimed, in part, that his equal protection and due
process rights under the state constitution were violated by the officers'
use of excessive force during the arrest. 62 The supreme court affirmed
the trial court, concluding that the trial judge likely dismissed the
charge of resisting arrest because the police used excessive force. The
court quoted from Taylor in its discussion of the trial judge's concern
regarding the use of excessive force. 63 However, the court held that
no constitutional violation existed.6 No other New Mexico court has
used language directly approving a claim for damages under the New
Mexico bill of rights.
Another factor in favor of recognizing an implied cause of action
is that the New Mexico courts have interpreted at least one provision
of the New Mexico bill of rights to be self-executing. In State v.
Rogers,65 the court found that the provision of the New Mexico bill
66
of rights requiring an indictment or information was self-executing.
In its analysis, the court provided criteria for determining whether a
provision is self-executing:
A constitutional provision may be said to be self-executing when
it takes immediate effect and ancillary legislation is not necessary
to the enjoyment of the right given, or the enforcement of the duty
imposed. In short,67 if a constitutional provision is complete in itself,
it executes itself.
However, the issue in Rogers was not whether damages could be
recovered for the government's failure to present the defendant's case
to a grand jury. 68 Thus, the extension of the Rogers language concerning
self-executing provisions of the constitution to imply a cause of action
for damages would not be direct.
A final factor in favor of implying a cause of action for damages
may derive from New Mexico case law. New Mexico has a tradition
of independently enforcing its bill of rights. 69 An illustrative example
of this tradition may be found in Skaggs Drug Center v. General
Electric Co. 70 The plaintiff in Skaggs was seeking a declaratory judgment
and an injunction preventing the enforcement of a price-fixing statute. 7'
The plaintiff claimed that the statute violated the natural rights, equal

62. Id. at 232, 316 P.2d at 246.
63. Id. at 233, 316 P.2d at 246.
64. Id.
65. 31 N.M. 485, 247 P. 828 (1926).
66. Id. at 497, 247 P. at 833. The provision discussed by the Rogers court states "No person
shall be held to answer for a capital felonious or infamous crime unless on a presentment or
indictment of a grand jury or information filed by a district attorney or Attorney General.
N.M. Co Ts. art. II, § 14.
67. Id. at 493, 247 P. at 831 (quoting Lanigan v. Gallup, 17 N.M. 627, 131 P. 997 (1913)).
68. Id. at 490-91, 247 P. at 830.
69. Notably, however, this tradition has been hampered by parties' failure to fully develop state
constitutional arguments for the courts. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
70. 63 N.M. 215, 315 P.2d 967 (1957).
71. Id. at 216-17, 315 P.2d at 967-68.
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protection, and due process protections of the New Mexico Constitution.72 Although the court considered precedent from other state
jurisdictions, it did not discuss parallel federal constitutional provisions
or their interpretations. Instead, the court engaged in an independent
analysis of the constitutionality of the statute and held that because
the statute bound persons who were not in privity to the contracts at
issue, the statute violated the natural law. 73 Additionally, the court
stated that the statute violated the due process and equal protection
clauses of the New Mexico constitution. 74 Even though the Skaggs
plaintiff sought an equitable, not a monetary remedy, the independent
use of the state constitution illustrates the New Mexico courts' tradition
of interpreting their constitution independently of any federal right that
might be implicated.
Finally, New Mexico has considered the issue of allowing damages
for violations of state constitutional rights by law enforcement officers.
It is doubtful, however, that the waiver of sovereign immunity for
violations of some constitutional rights by law enforcement personnel
authorizes suits for damages for violation of all constitutional rights.
Article II, section 4 of the constitution provides that persons have the
right "of seeking and obtaining safety and happiness." ' 5 New Mexico
courts have consistently refused to allow suits under this section brought
under the auspices of the waiver of sovereign immunity for violations
76
by law enforcement officers found in the Tort Claims Act.
The New Mexico Supreme Court first considered this issue in California First Bank v. State.77 Because the court found the defendant
police officers immune from suit for the primary claims of wrongful
death and personal injury, it did not rule on the state constitutional
claims. Although the plaintiff included a claim for damages for violation
of his article II, section 4 rights, the court declined to reach the issue
of "whether, and under what circumstances, violation of its provisions
gives rise to a cause of action for damages under the provisions of
the Tort Claims Act.

'

78
9

The court directly addressed this issue in Caillouette v. Hercules,

Inc.79 In Caillouette, the plaintiff brought claims for wrongful death

and violations of the decedent's state constitutional rights to safety
and happiness. 0 The court held that there was no waiver of sovereign
immunity for violations of article II, section 4, claiming that "[i]f we
were to base a waiver of immunity on these provisions, the exception

72. Id. at 220-21, 315 P.2d at 970.
73. Id. at 226-27, 315 P.2d at 974-75.
74. See id.
75. N.M. CONST. art. 11, § 4.
76. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-12 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
77. 111 N.M. 64, 801 P.2d 646 (1990).
78. Id. at 76, 801 P.2d at 658.
79. 113 N.M. 492, 827 P.2d 1306 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 352, 826 P.2d 573 (1992).
80. Id. at 495-96, 827 P.2d at 1309-10.
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thug created would eliminate the principle of sovereign immunity."'"
The court failed to elaborate on why it believed that a waiver of
immunity for violations of article II, section 4 would swallow the whole
concept of sovereign immunity. Presumably, the article II, section 4
protections are so ambiguous as to encompass any wrongful act. Apparently, the court failed to distinguish between wholesale acceptance
of claims for violations of article II, section 4, and limited claims
based on specifically waived immunity. Instead, the court determined
that an official's immunity for violation of article II, section 4 precluded
that section from providing cognizable rights. 2
One additional case has discussed the issue of whether a claim can
be brought against law enforcement officers for violations of state
constitutional rights based on the waiver of immunity in the Tort Claims
Act. In Blea v. City of Espafiola,83 claims for wrongful death, personal
injuries, and violations of article II, sections 4 and 18 of the New
Mexico Constitution were brought against police officers.8 4 The court
summarily dismissed the issue of the officers' liability under article II,
section 4, stating that a "[w]aiver of immunity based on such constitutional grounds would emasculate the immunity preserved in the Tort
Claims Act." 8 5 The court declined to rule on the article II, section 18
due process claim, however, and remanded the issue to the trial court
to determine whether the plaintiff could raise a claim for a violation
of the state due process clause and whether that claim would fit within
the Tort Claims Act's waiver of immunity. 6 Nevertheless, the Blea
court did recognize the distinction between a plaintiff claiming that an
interest protected by the state constitution had
been violated and finding
8 7
that sovereign immunity barred that claim.
III.

OTHER JURISDICTIONS' APPROACHES TO SUITS FOR
DAMAGES UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS

Given the uncertain state of the law in New Mexico, an examination
of other jurisdictions' approaches is helpful in understanding the options
New Mexico might take when confronted with the issue of fashioning
a remedy for violations of the state constitution. Four models that
New Mexico might use in considering whether to fashion damages
remedies for violations of the state constitution emerge from other

81. Id. at 497, 827 P.2d at 1311. Plaintiff also claimed that the defendant police officer had
violated N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-4B-5 by breaching his duty to investigate automobile accidents,
creating a negligence cause of action. Id. at 496, 827 P.2d at 1310. The court proceeded to discuss
in detail why violating the general duty to investigate did not give rise to a negligence cause of
action, but failed to provide reasoning as to why violating N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 4 did not fit
within the waiver of immunity in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-12. Id. at 496-97, 827 P.2d at 1310-11.
82. Id. at 495, 827 P.2d at 1310.
83. 117 N.M. 217, 870 P.2d 755 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 117 N.M. 328, 871 P.2d 984 (1994).
84. Id. at 219-22, 870 P.2d at 757-60.
85. Id. at 221, 870 P.2d at 759.
86. Id. at 221-22, 870 P.2d at 759-60.
87. Id.
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jurisdictions: 1) statutorily-created causes of action; 2) judicially-created
causes of action based primarily on state law; 3) judicially-created
causes of action with heavy reliance on the federal model; and 4)
judicial refusal to recognize a cause of action for damages absent
direction from the legislature. These models will be fully developed
below.
A.

The Federal Solution
Any person whose federal constitutional rights are violated by a
person acting under the authority of state law has a statutorily-created
cause of action."8 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only addresses violations by state,
not federal officials. The federal constitution thus seems to parallel
the New Mexico Constitution; while the federal constitution provides
protections against intrusions on individual liberties, there is no codification of a possible action for damages against federal officials for
violations of individuals' federal constitutional rights. Absent direction
from Congress, the federal courts were left to fashion remedies for
those violations or leave injured plaintiffs without redress.
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics,8 9 the plaintiff presented the U.S. Supreme Court with an
action for damages against a federal official for violations of the
plaintiff's federal constitutional rights. Bivens sued narcotics officers
for damages incurred as the result of a search and seizure conducted
in violation of the federal Fourth Amendment. 90 The Court found, in
part, that the action for damages was appropriate and that "petitioner
[was] entitled to recover money damages for any injuries he has suffered
as a result of the agents' violation of the Amendment." 9' These findings
were central to the Court's holding that damages had historically been
afforded in cases based on "invasion[s] of personal interests in liberty; ' 92 and that "where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal
statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal
courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done." 93
Because the federal constitution's Fourth Amendment granted a general
right of access to federal courts, the Court reasoned, the federal courts
94
had the power to grant damages for invasions of that amendment.

88. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
89. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
90. Id. at 389.
91. Id. at 397.
92. Id.at 395.
93. Id. at 396.
94. Id.at 397.
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The Bivens Court recognized that allowing a claim for damages against
federal officers for violations of the federal constitution might not be
appropriate in all instances. For example, no remedy would be implied
when Congress addressed specific types of constitutional violations by
creating a statutory scheme intended to be a substitute for a judicial
remedy. 95 No such scheme was found in the Bivens case.
The Court also considered the fact that Congress had not explicitly
authorized suits for damages against federal officials. However, given
the federal courts' general power to grant relief for violations of the
federal constitution, the Court held that because there were "no special
factors counseling hesitation, ' 96 the use of a damage remedy was
appropriate. The Court provided two examples of special factors that
would cause it to hesitate. The first is when a question of "federal
fiscal policy" is involved. 97 The second is in actions against congressional
employees for ultra vires actions. 9
The Court has subsequently clarified the limitations on judiciallycreated remedies for violations of the federal constitution. First, the
Court has held that it will consider whether the defendant's position
enjoys special treatment by the federal constitution that would convince
a court not to allow a damages remedy against the defendant. 99 Second,
the Court also will consider whether allowing the suit will constrain
federal officers in the performance of their duties because of the fear
of liability. 100 Third, the Court has noted that actions for damages for
federal constitutional violations have not been allowed where an alternative remedy exists and was intended by Congress to be the exclusive
remedy for violations of federal constitutional rights.10' This third factor
has caused considerable confusion in the lower federal courts as the
Supreme Court failed to fashion a standard indicating when a statutory
remedy is intended by Congress to preclude an action for damages

under the federal constitution .102
An important factor to consider is that while a suit for damages
against a federal officer based on violations of the federal constitution
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 454 (1989).
96. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980).
100. Id. at 19.
101. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983). The Court held that because the suit arose out
of a federal employment dispute, and the administrative remedies available for plaintiff's claims
were so comprehensive, Congress intended them to be the sole recourse for a litigant in plaintiff's
position. Id. at 390. See also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988), in which the administrative
remedies available to a person with a grievance related to the denial of Social Security Benefits
alleged to be in violation of the federal constitution were held to have been intended by Congress
to be the only remedy, precluding an action for damages based on that denial. Id. at 428-29.
102. See discussion in CHEMERINSKY, supra note 95, at 461-64. Chemerinsky postulates that the
United States Supreme Court has hinted in recent cases that it is more likely to find that a statutorilycreated administrative remedial scheme was intended by Congress to be the exclusive remedy for
violations of federal constitutional rights. Such an approach is indicated by the Bush and Chilicky
courts' refusal to allow damage suits under Bivens, Chemerinsky concludes, and reflects "the Court's
retreat from the Bivens cause of action." Id.

95.
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might otherwise be appropriate, the officer may still be immune from

suit. Numerous official immunities, both absolute and qualified, have
developed around § 1983 and Bivens suits. 103
B.

Other States' Approaches

Short of an explicit state constitutional provision for damages under
a state bill of rights, the most direct way to provide such a remedy

is in a statute. At least two states, Arkansas 01 4 and Maine, 0 5 have
fashioned Civil Rights Acts which provide for direct causes of action
for damages for violations of their state constitutions. In the absence
of such provisions, however, individuals seeking damages for infringements of their state constitutional rights must persuade their state
judiciary to imply such a remedy.
As more litigants turn to the state courts for vindication of their

individual rights, more states have been forced to address the issue of
whether to allow actions for damages under their state constitutions.
In the last nine years, the number of states allowing such actions has

risen to twelve. The states that have recognized a cause of action have
done so in two ways. Six have relied almost solely upon their state
constitutional and common law, concluding that a person whose state

constitutional rights have been violated have a cause of action for
damages directly under the state constitution. Those states are Alabama, 10 6 California, 0 7 Florida, 08 Illinois, 0 9 Mississippi, 10 and Penn-

103. A comprehensive discussion of those immunities, however, is beyond the scope of this article,
which focuses instead on the threshold question of whether damage suits are appropriate. For an
excellent discussion of those immunities, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 95, at §§ 8.6, 9.1.
104. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-103 (Michie 1987).
105. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4682 (West 1993).
106. See Bull v. Armstrong, 48 So. 2d 467, 470 (Ala. 1950) (recognizing that "a law enforcement
officer who makes an illegal search [under the Alabama Constitution] of a person's premises is
liable to that person in an action at law for damages").
107. See Gay Law Students Ass'n. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 595 P.2d 592 (1979) (finding that a
group whose California constitutional equal protection rights have been violated can bring suit for
damages); Laguna Pub. Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 182 Cal. Rptr. 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)
(recognizing direct right of action under the California constitution free speech provision against a
company town-like community), appeal denied, 459 U.S. 1192 (1983).
108. See Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines & Risk Mgmt. Servs., 408 So. 2d 711, 713-14, 71920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 432 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1983) (noting that the Florida Equal
Protection Clause is self-executing, giving rise to a cause of action for incidents predating the Florida
human rights provisions, but forbidding plaintiff's claim because the employer was not a state
actor); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 23.161-23.167 (West 1979) (providing cause of action for individuals
discriminated against in private employment).
109. See Dilley v. Americana Healthcare Corp., 472 N.E.2d 596, 603 (I11.
App. Ct. 1984) (holding
that the sole forum for any employment discrimination case brought under the Illinois constitution
is through the administrative process set up by the Illinois Human Rights Act, this holding severely
weakened the remedy recognized in Walinski); Walinski v. Morrison & Morrison, 377 N.E.2d 242,
244-45 (II1. App. Ct. 1978) (allowing a plaintiff to seek punitive and compensatory damages from
a private employer for employment discrimination in violation of the Illinois constitution); Newell
v. City of Elgin, 340 N.E.2d 344, 349 (I11.
App. Ct. 1976) (allowing a cause of action against
municipalities and their employee police officers under the Illinois constitution).
110. See Stringer v. State, 491 So. 2d 837, 849 (Miss. 1986) (stating that "Ithe citizen, vis a
vis the searching law enforcement officer, has at least the theoretical possibility of a remedy in the
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sylvania." The second way that states have recognized a cause of action
for damages directly under their state constitution is through the use
of their own constitutional law precedent and the federal Bivens"2 line
of cases. Those states are Louisiana," 3 Maryland,' 1 4 Massachusetts," 5
Michigan,1 6 New Jersey," 7 and North Carolina."' These approaches
are illustrated by two cases that are particularly useful in attempting
to understand possible avenues that New Mexico might take in recognizing a right of action under its bill of rights.
Maryland follows the first model, relying heavily and almost exclusively on its own state constitutional law precedent to recognize a cause
of action for damages for violations of the state constitution. In
Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hospital Center, Mr. Widgeon brought suit
against a state hospital and various individuals, seeking damages for
violations of the Maryland Constitution's due process provision and
prohibition against warrantless searches." 9 The court first noted that
"[u]nder the common law of England, where individual rights, such
as those now protected by [the constitutional section at issue], were
preserved by a fundamental document (e.g., the Magna Carta), a vi-

form of a civil action for damages"); Mayes v. Till, 266 So. 2d 578, 581 (Miss. 1972) (accepting
without discussion the principle that police officers could be liable for damages caused by theft as
a result of their intrusive search if "loss by theft [was] a reasonably foreseeable consequence of
their unlawful acts").
111. See Harley v. Schuylkill County, 476 F. Supp. 191, 196 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (holding that a
person whose state constitutional due process rights have been violated may maintain a direct cause
of action under that section); Hunter v. Port Authority, 419 A.2d 631, 636, n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1980) (noting that "a cause of action arises directly under the [Pennsylvania] Constitution for the
violation of rights guaranteed under article 1, section 1, and no affirmative legislation is needed
for the vindication of those rights in the civil courts").
112. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971);
see also supra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
113. See Moresi v. Department of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1092-93 (La. 1990)
(concluding that "damages may be obtained by an individual for injuries or loss caused by a
violation of [the Louisiana constitutional search and seizure provision]).
114. See Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 479 A.2d 921, 922 (Md. 1984) (holding that
"Maryland recognizes a common law action for damages for violations of state constitutional
rights").
115. See Phillips v. Youth Dev. Program, 459 N.E.2d 453, 457-58 (Mass. 1983) (recognizing that,
in theory at least, "a person whose [state] constitutional rights have been interfered with may be
entitled to judicial relief even in the absence of a statute providing a procedural vehicle for obtaining
relief" but declining to address plaintiff's claims because of a lack of briefing on the question of
state action).
116. See Smith v. Department of Public Health, 410 N.W.2d 749 (Mich. 1987), aff'd, Will v.
Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); 77th District Judge v. State, 438 N.W.2d 333
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (discussed infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text).
117. See Lloyd v. Stone Harbor, 432 A.2d 572, 579-83 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981) (allowing
an employment discrimination claim for damages under the New Jersey Constitution and finding
that the claim was unaffected by the availability of other remedies and that state officials are not
immune from such a suit).
118. See Corum v. University of North Carolina, 413 S.E.2d 276, 289-90, 292 (N.C.) (finding a
strong independent line of state cases emphasizing the importance of state constitutionally protected
free speech, noting that "in the absence of an adequate state remedy, one whose state constitutional
rights have been abridged has a direct claim against the State under our Constitution," and holding
that sovereign immunity does not bar such a suit against a state official acting in his official
capacity), cert. denied, Durham v. Corum, 113 S. Ct. 493 (1992).
119. Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 479 A.2d 921, 923 (Md. 1984).
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olation of those rights generally could be remedied by a traditional
action for damages.' 120 The court then examined Maryland common
law and constitutional history and concluded that not only did Maryland
have an illustrious history of enforcing individual rights and allowing
actions for damages under the Maryland Constitution, but also that
the framers of the constitution intended that actions for damages be
allowed.' 2' The court also referred to the Bivens line of cases, 22
and
23
cited numerous other states that had recognized similar claims.
After examining the relevant law, the court addressed some of the
hospital's concerns. 2 4 First, the court directed its attention to the
concern that it would be "inappropriate" to allow a remedy for a
violation of the state constitutional rights in light of the existing federal
remedies and state tort remedies. The court observed that
It is a well-settled rule ... that where a particular set of facts
gives rise to alternative causes of action, they may be brought
together in one declaration, and where several remedies are requested, an election is not required prior to final judgment ....
Additionally, under some circumstances, a state constitutional provision may recognize and preserve an interest that
is wholly unprotected under state common law and statutes.125
Second, the court responded to the assertion that allowing Widgeon
to proceed on his constitutional claims would force the court to create
a new cause of action. Instead of relying wholly on federal or other
precedent, the court reasoned that "where a statute establishes an
individual right, imposes a corresponding duty on the government, and
fails to provide an express statutory remedy, a traditional common law
action will ordinarily lie.' ' 26 Because the Maryland constitution did
establish an individual right and impose a duty upon the government
to avoid infringing that right, the court found that a suit for damages
was appropriate based solely on the "liberty and property interest"
27
sections of the Maryland Constitution.
The second model of implying a cause of action for damages for
violations of a state constitution is illustrated by Michigan's approach
to the issue, which relies upon both Michigan state constitutional law
28
and the Bivens line of cases. In Smith v. Department of Public Health,
the Michigan Supreme Court held that "[a] claim for damages against
the state arising from violation by the state of the Michigan Constitution

120. Id. at 924.
121. See id.at 925-27.
122. See supra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
123. Widgeon at 927-28.
124. Id. at 928-30.
125. Id.
126. Id.at 929.
127. Id.
128. 410 N.W.2d 749 (Mich. 1987) (memorandum opinion), cert. granted sub nom, Will v. Michigan
Dep't of State Police, 485 U.S. 1005 (1988), aff'd, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
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may be recognized in appropriate cases.' 1 29 The court did not, however,
specify what those appropriate cases might be. The brief memorandum
opinion merely stated the principles of law on which the justices agreed.
No rationale or guidelines for the stated principles were discussed in
the memorandum opinion, leaving it to the lower courts to develop
the criteria of what might constitute "appropriate cases." This approach
illustrates the practical difficulties of providing damages through an
implied cause of action.
In the most recent Michigan case to address the issue of what
circumstances might be appropriate to justify a court's award of damages for constitutional violations, 77th District Judge v. State,3 0 the
equal protection clause of the Michigan constitution was at issue. A
district court judge sued the state, claiming that the different rates of
compensation of district judges throughout the state based on a statutory
classification scheme violated the equal protection provision of the
Michigan Constitution. 3 ' After noting that the Smith opinion was
nonbinding because of a lack of a "majority rationale," the court
examined the Smith concurring opinions and adopted Justice Brinkley's
analysis to determine when damages should be awarded in state constitutional violation cases.'1 2 That analysis requires a consideration of
four factors: whether precedent supports the fashioning of a remedy;
whether the fashioning of such a remedy would deter similar conduct
in the future; the fact that "[tjhe courts should defer to the policymaking expertise of the Legislature in devising remedies;" and whether
there are any "special factors counseling hesitation" in fashioning a
remedy.'
The 77th District Judge court refused to allow an action for damages,
applying the four factors as follows:
[F]irst[,] ...

the parties [did] not cite any precedential authority

for a damages remedy for the type of constitutional violation at
issue here, nor are we aware of any such authority. Second, deterrence of tortious conduct is not at issue in this case. Third, issues
of judicial compensation would appear to be uniquely directed to
the policy-making expertise of the Legislature. Fourth, .

.

. [a spe-

cific provision in the Michigan constitution empowers] the [ljegislature
3 4
to implement enforcement mechanisms for equal protection.
Although the court recognized the Smith's principle that damages may
be appropriate in some cases, it severely limited such actions by using

129. Id. at 751. The opinion noted that "[tihis memorandum opinion is signed by the six
participating Justices. There are separate concurring and dissenting opinions. However, at least four
Justices concur in every holding, statement and disposition of this memorandum opinion." Id.
130. 438 N.W.2d 333 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
131. Id. at 334.
132. Id. at 338-39.
133. Id. at 339. These factors were "the product of four distinct reasons derived from the Bivens
line of cases and applied to the facts in [Smith]." Id.
134. Id.
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Justice Brinkley's factors. As in the development of the federal case
law following Bivens, it remains unclear in which situation, if any, the
Michigan court would be amenable to allowing a plaintiff to recover
damages for an infringement of rights guaranteed under the Michigan
constitution.
Despite the apparent trend toward recognition of a right to sue for
damages under state bills of rights, six state courts have declined or
refused to create such a remedy: Alaska,' Connecticut, 3 6 Hawaii,' 7
New Hampshire,' 38 Ohio,3 9 and Oregon. 140 Of these six, Ohio and
Hawaii illustrate two similar approaches to a denial of recognition of
a right to sue for damages under a state constitution.
In Provens, the plaintiff brought suit against a county board of
mental retardation seeking damages for violations of her rights guaranteed by the Ohio Constitution.' 4' Addressing the state constitutional
argument, the court first noted that the "constitutional provision does
not set forth an accompanying cause of action for a violation ...
[and] the Ohio General Assembly has not authorized such an action.' 42
The court then examined the Bivens line of cases, noting that the
federal judiciary "has generally exercised extreme caution" in fashioning
monetary remedies for violations of individual constitutional rights.' 4
Additionally, the court approvingly cited an Alaska decision which
declined to fashion a new tort because of the existence of "a comprehensive scheme of employee rights and remedies" under the Alaskan
constitution.' 44 Finally, the court examined the remedies available to a
plaintiff claiming injuries similar to Provens' injuries.' 45 Because various
remedies already existed through state tort and administrative law, the
court reasoned, it should not create an independent cause of action
based upon the state constitution.' 46 Instead, the court deferred to the

135. See Farmer v. State, 788 P.2d 43, 50 n.17 (Alaska 1990) (declining to address the issue of
whether "the state constitution gives rise to an implied right of action").
136. See Kelley Property Dev. v. Town of Lebanon, 627 A.2d 909, 922 (Conn. 1993) (declining
to "construe our state constitution to provide a basis for the recognition of a private damages
action for injuries for which the legislature has provided a reasonably adequate statutory remedy").
137. See Figueroa v. State, 604 P.2d 1198 (Haw. 1979) (discussed infra text accompanying notes
148-54).
138. See Rockhouse Mountain Property Owners Ass'n v. Town of Conway, 503 A.2d 1385, 138889 (N.H. 1986) (refusing to allow a direct cause of action under the New Hampshire constitution
because of the availability of alternative remedies and the existence of official immunity).
139. See Provens v. Stark County Bd. of Mental Retardation, 594 N.E.2d 959 (Ohio 1992). For
discussion, see infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
140. See Hunter v. City of Eugene, 787 P.2d 881, 884 (Or. 1990) (holding that "[ijf an implied
private right of action for damages for governmental violations of Article I, Section 8, and other
nonself-executing state constitutional provisions is to exist, it is appropriate that it come from the
legislature, not by action of this court.").
141. Provens, 594 N.E.2d at 960.
142. Id. at 961.
143. Id. at 962.
144. Id. at 963 (quoting Walt v. State, 751 P.2d 1345 (Alaska 1988)).
145. Id. at 964-65.
146. Id. at 965-66.
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of action for damages for
legislature the task of creating a cause
147
violations of the Ohio Constitution.
The Hawaii courts have taken a different approach to denying claims
for damages under the state bill of rights. In Figueroa v. State,' 48 the
plaintiff brought suit against the state for injuries received, in part,
by the state's alleged violations of his state constitutional rights.' 49 In
discussing the state constitutional claims, the court proceeded directly
to a discussion of the state's immunity from suit.' 50 The court noted
that the "[S]tate as sovereign is immune from suit except as it consents
to be sued,"' 5 ' and the fact that the Hawaii bill of rights provisions
are textually self-executing did not constitute a waiver of that immunity. 5 2 Finally, the court addressed the Hawaii State Tort Liability
Act, calling it "a specific waiver of tort immunity.""' The court
reasoned that the effect of the Act was to waive immunity only for
by the Act, not to "visit
those causes of action specifically mentioned
' 54
the sovereign with novel liabilities."'
Options for a New Mexico Remedy-Models From Other States
and the Federal Courts
An examination of existing federal and state law precedents provides
four distinct options that New Mexico could follow in considering
whether to allow monetary remedies for violations of state constitutional
rights. First, New Mexico could create a statutory cause of action
specifically authorizing suits for damages for violations of the state
constitution. This option is supported by the existence of similar statutes
in other states' 55 and the federal statutory cause of action. 5 6 Two
existing statutes might be appropriate vehicles for authorizing such
suits. As the New Mexico Tort Claims Act 57 already authorizes suits
against law enforcement officers for violations of state constitutional
rights, an extension to other officers would not be without precedent.
which authorizes suits for
The New Mexico Human Rights Act,'
damages caused by discrimination, also might be an appropriate place
to legislatively authorize suits for damages for violations of rights
guaranteed by the state constitution. This approach, which is similar
C.

147. Id. at 965.
148. 604 P.2d 1198 (Haw.
149. Id. at 1200.

1979).

150. Id. at 1205.
151.

Id.

152. "Article XIV, Section 15 of the [Hawaii] State Constitution . . .provides that all its provisions
are 'self-executing to the fullest extent that their respective natures permit."' Id. at 1206 (citation
omitted).
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id. at 1207.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-103 (Michie Supp. 1993); 5 Mo. REV. STAT. § 4682 (1993).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-2 (1978).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-1 to 28-1-15 (1978).
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.to the federal statutory scheme,'1 9 would give significant guidance to
the New Mexico courts when confronted with suits for damages under
the state constitution.
Second, New Mexico courts could imply the existence of a cause of
action by relying upon existing New Mexico case law, other states' case
law, New Mexico constitutional history and general principles of remedies. This argument finds support in the principle that if the constitutional provision creates a right and imposes a corresponding duty
upon the state, a remedy for a violation of that right should be
60
recognized. ,
Third, New Mexico could imply a cause of action by relying upon
both its own jurisprudence and the Bivens line of cases.' 6' Bivens implied
a damages action based on the general availability of the federal courts
for violations of federal constitutional rights and subsequent federal
cases have set forth limits on the availability of such a remedy. t62
Similarly, state courts using Bivens to imply a remedy have extricated
other distinct factors to consider in deciding whether to imply a remedy. 63
Fourth, the New Mexico courts could explicitly refuse to recognize
a damage cause of action for violations of the state bill of rights.
That refusal could be based on a decision to leave the matter to the
legislature, 64 or on a finding that the principle of sovereign immunity
precludes liability for violations of state constitutional rights.' 65
A fifth option open to New Mexico is not found in any other state
or the federal system. In April, 1993, an act creating a New Mexico
constitutional revision commission went into effect. 66 The Act created
a commission and charged it to
examine the constitution of New Mexico and the constitutions of
other states to recommend changes in the constitution of New Mexico
as it deems desirable and necessary. Upon majority approval of the
fifteen members appointed by the governor, legislation shall be
drafted in accordance with the provisions of Article 19 of the
constitution of New Mexico.' 67

159. See discussion of 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1979), supra note 88 and accompanying text.
160. Such a course was followed by the Maryland courts in Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp.
Ctr., 479 A.2d 921 (Md. 1989). See discussion supra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
161. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) and its progeny. For discussion, see supra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
162. See discussion supra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., 77th District Judge v. State, 438 N.W.2d at 339 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). The
factors and their application are explained supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Provens v. Stark County Bd. of Mental Retardation, 594 N.E.2d 959 (Ohio 1992),
see discussion supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
165. The Court could find that sovereign immunity precludes liability either through the general
principle of sovereign immunity or because the New Mexico Tort Claims Act does not explicitly
waive sovereign immunity for violations of state constitutional rights. See, e.g., Figueroa v. State,
604 P.2d 1198 (Haw. 1979); see discussion supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
166. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-15-1 to 12-15-7 (Repl. Pamp. 1994) [hereinafter "the Act"].
167. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-15-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
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The Act placed no restrictions upon the scope of review of the Commission. It may recommend that language be added to the New Mexico
bill of rights that authorizes suits for damages for violations of its
provisions. If such a recommendation is made, any resulting legislation
would have to undergo the process for constitutional amendment, including approval by the legislature and people of New Mexico before
it would become part of the constitution of the State of New Mexico.
The temporal scope of the Commission is limited, however; the Act
68
also charges the Commission to make its report to the 1995 legislature.
Any proposal would have to be considered quickly in order to get the
Commission's approval and start the amendment process.
IV. PROSPECTS FOR THE TREATMENT OF CLAIMS FOR
DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE NEW MEXICO BILL OF
RIGHTS
Prospects for the Recognition of Claims for Damages
Given that New Mexico has historically recognized that a state official
may be liable for violations of state constitutional rights, 6 9 that portions
170 and
of the bill of rights have been explicitly read to be self-executing,
that New Mexico has a tradition of enforcing its bill of rights independently of federal jurisprudence, 17 a strong case may be made for implying72
a cause of action for damages for violations of the state bill of rights.
A court taking such a course could also draw support from the facts
that twelve states currently recognize a cause of action for damages for
has
violations of their bills of rights 73 and that the federal system
74
cases.
of
line
Bivens
the
in
action
of
cause
similar
a
recognized
Bivens can be read to directly support the recognition of a damages
cause of action for violations of the state bill of rights. The two main
rationales which the Bivens Court used to imply a cause of action are
also present in New Mexico' 7 5-an historical basis for awarding damages
for invasions of personal liberty, and courts which have traditionally

A.

168. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-15-4 (RepI. Pamp. 1994).
169. See Territory of New Mexico v. Taylor, 11 N.M. 588, 71 P. 489 (1903). For discussion,
see supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
170. See State v. Rogers, 31 N.M. 485, 247 P. 828 (1926). For discussion, see supra notes 6568 and accompanying text.
171. See Skaggs Drug Ctr. v. General Elec. Co., 63 N.M. 215, 315 P.2d 967 (1957). For discussion,
see supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
172. A similar list of factors was used to justify implying a cause of action in Maryland in
Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hospital Ctr., 479 A.2d 921 (Md. 1984). For discussion, see supra notes
119-27 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
175. There is historical precedent for allowing damages for similar cases, Bivens, 403 U.S. at
395-96, and the general principle that "where legal rights have been violated, and a federal statute
provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy
to make good the wrong done." Id. at 396 (citation omitted) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
684 (1946).
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been available for suits in equity. Based upon the confluence of these
two lines of cases, one could argue that the courts should expand their
power to remedy constitutional violations through damage awards where
appropriate.
Of course, Bivens also contained a caveat; if special factors weigh
against implying a cause of action, the courts should reject fashioning
such a remedy. 7 6 Since the Bivens line of cases includes cases declining
to recognize a cause of action and other states' refusal to fashion a
remedy, a strong case can also be made to limit an implied remedy.
Additionally, damages for many of the injuries for which a plaintiff
might seek redress under the state bill of rights may already be compensable through other avenues. These include traditional tort actions
such as trespass, contract actions, and actions under the New Mexico
Human Rights Act and the federal section 1983. The availability of other
means of remedying an injury is a factor which should counsel hesitation
in the courts in fashioning a new remedy.77
B.

Limitations on the Availability of Claims for Damages
Despite the possibility that a plaintiff may be able to seek redress
under the state bill of rights, two specific structural barriers and limitations
to the recognition of an implied cause of action exist. The first is a
state action requirement. In State v. Johnston17 the New Mexico Court
of Appeals held that a private hospital employee, acting for purposes
of medical treatment and not under instruction of a state official, was
not subject to the prohibitions against unreasonable search and seizure
as found in article II, section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution.' 79 The
practical effect of the Johnson holding is to limit any rights that an
individual might have under the state bill of rights against violations by
state officials.
The second major impediment to implying a cause of action for damages
for violations of state constitutional rights in New Mexico is sovereign
immunity. New Mexico courts currently seem firmly wedded to the concept
that if a waiver of sovereign immunity is not found in the Tort Claims
Act, even for violations of the state constitution, then the assertion of
sovereign immunity bars suits for those violations.' 80 The courts have
failed to confront the issue, however, of whether a statutory imposition
of sovereign immunity can overcome a right of action rooted in the state
constitution. Clearly, as indicated in Ferguson v. New Mexico State
Highway Commission, the Tort Claims Act's reimposition of sovereign

176. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 399.
177. See id. at 396.
178. 108 N.M. 778, 780, 779 P.2d 556, 588 (Ct. App. 1989).
179. Id. at 780, 779 P.2d at 558.
180. New Mexico courts have recently held that although N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-12 specifically
waives immunity for violations of state constitutional rights, certain rights are not covered by that
waiver. See Blea v. City of Espaftola, 117 N.M. 217, 870 P.2d 755 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 117
N.M. 328, 871 P.2d 984 (1994).
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immunity following its common law abolition in Hicks is constitutional.' 8
However, if Hicks completely abolished sovereign immunity and the Tort
Claims Act reinstated it, that legislative pronouncement of immunity may
not have been sufficient to create immunity for violations of the state
84
constitution. Blea,182 Caillouette, 83 and California First Bank all held
that the Tort Claims Act's sovereign immunity could preclude a claim
for violations of the state constitution, but they did not address the issue
of how statutory immunity overcomes a constitutional right of action.
New Mexico's position on sovereign immunity can be contrasted with
Hawaii's position, which found that because sovereign immunity in Hawaii
is a common law concept, it precludes suits even for constitutional
85 While
violations, unless that immunity has been specifically waived.
86
the Hawaii court held that it was not able to abolish sovereign immunity,
87
the New Mexico courts did not feel so constrained. 1 Thus, the relevant
question may not be whether the courts can abolish sovereign immunity,
but whether the legislature can establish sovereign immunity for violations
of the constitution.
General support for this proposition may be found in the recent case
of Campos v. State,'88 in which the court, considering a statute authorizing
warrantless arrests, stated: "To give the statute conclusive effect would
be to abdicate our duty as the primary interpreters of our constitution
and would give the legislative branch the power to define constitutional
'
provisions in violation of separation of powers. "189 Similar language is
9°
found in the Court of Appeals opinion of State v. Armijo, in which
the court, considering the constitutionality of a statute authorizing appeals
from dismissals without prejudice in criminal cases, stated: "The legislature, by statute, may not diminish a right expressly provided by the
constitution; no branch of government may add to, nor detract from
the constitution's clear mandate."' 19 Significantly, both of the above cases
considered statutes dealing with criminal rights.
The most recent and authoritative statement on the subject of the
legislature's power to limit civil damages remedies under the state con192
stitution is found in Ford v. New Mexico Department of Public Safety.

181. 99 N.M. 194, 656 P.2d 244 (Ct. App. 1982); see also Hydro Conduit Corp. v. Kemble,
110 N.M. 173, 177 n.2, 793 P.2d 855, 858 n.2, and discussion supra notes 26-30 and accompanying
text.
182. See Blea v. City of Espafhola, 117 N.M. 217, 870 P.2d 755 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 117
N.M. 328, 871 P.2d 984 (1994).
183. See Caillouette v. Hercules, Inc., 113 N.M. 492, 827 P.2d 1306 (Ct. App. 1992).
184. 111 N.M. 64, 801 P.2d 646 (1990).
185. See Figueroa v. State, 604 P.2d 1198, 1205-07 (Haw. 1979).
186. Id. at 1205.
187. See Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975).
188. 117 N.M. 155, 870 P.2d 117 (1994).
189. Id. at 158, 870 P.2d at 120.
190. 118 N.M. 802, 887 P.2d 1269 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 118 N.M. 20, 888 P.2d 466 (1994).
191. Id.at 805, 887 P.2d at 1272 (quoting State v. Santillanes, 96 N.M. 482, 632 P.2d 359, 363
(Ct. App. 1980) (internal quotation and citation omitted)).
, 890 P.2d
891 P.2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, - N.M. __
_,
N.M.
192. __
807 (1995).
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The Ford court flatly rejected the plaintiff's claims for damages for
violations of his state constitutional rights argued under a Bivens-type
theory. 93 Particularly relevant to the issues in this article, the court stated:
If the state legislature deems it in the public interest not to permit
damage actions under state law for violations of state or federal
constitutional rights, there appears to be no obstacle to a statute
enacting that immunity ...

Although the legislature cannot eliminate

or limit a constitutional right, it need not provide a damage remedy
for a violation of that right. (Of course, the federal Civil Rights Act
provides a federal remedy for violations by state and local officials
of federal constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.) 94

Plaintiffs seeking damage remedies under the state constitution need not
give up hope. Although the New Mexico Supreme Court has declined
to review the Court of Appeals' decisions that expressly reject plaintiffs'
rights, given the supreme court's recent trend of broadening the avenues
in which plaintiffs may bring suit, 95 a plaintiff that persuades the court
to consider the questions presented herein might well prevail in his
argument that the Tort Claims Act does not restrict the right to sue for
damages under the state constitution.
The issue of whether a litigant may sue for damages under the New
Mexico bill of rights might be more properly framed as when a litigant
may sue for damages. The precedents of Taylor'9 and Patrick'97 suggest
that such a remedy has historical support. The holding in Montes'9
suggests that allowing damages remedies is appropriate in suits against
law enforcement officers based on the waiver of immunity in the Tort
Claims Act. Finally, while the Blea' 99 court did not allow a suit based
on the article II, section 4 guarantees of safety and happiness, it left
the question open as to whether damages could be allowed for violations
of the state due process clause by law enforcement officers. 2 ° When all

of New Mexico law, including state, federal, and territorial is considered,
there is more than a suggestion that under some circumstances New
Mexico would recognize the awarding of damages for state constitutional
violations. The hesitancy derives from a concern for limits, including a

193. Id. at __
, 891 P.2d at 553.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Torres v. State,
- N.M. __,
894 P.2d 386 (1995) (holding that persons in
California were not unforeseeable as a matter of law to Albuquerque police investigating murder);

Clay v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 118 N.M. 266, 881 P.2d 11 (1994) (actions of defendant's employees
aggregated to satisfy culpable mental state intended to justify punitive damages); Mireles v. Broderick,
117 N.M. 445, 872 P.2d 863 (1994) (allowing expert testimony to be used to establish an inference

of negligence in res ipsa loquitur cases); Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez, Ill N.M. 336, 805
P.2d 603 (1991) (allowing plaintiff to recover from doctor who negligently performed unsuccessful
sterilization
726 (1990)
196. See
197. See
198. See
199. See
200. Id.

costs of raising baby to adulthood); Schmitz v. Smentowski, 109 N.M. 386, 785 P.2d
(adopting prima facie tort).
Territory of New Mexico v. Taylor, II N.M. 588, 71 P. 489 (1903).
City of Albuquerque v. Patrick, 63 N.M. 227, 316 P.2d 243 (1957).
Montes v. Gallegos, 812 F. Supp. 1165 (D.N.M. 1992).
Blea v. City of Espafhola, 117 N.M. 217, 221-22, 870 P.2d 755, 759-60 (Ct. App. 1994).
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state action requirement and sovereign immunity, which have not yet
been fully considered or developed.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although a persuasive argument can be made for the recognition of
an implied right to recover damages for violations of a state constitutional
right, an equally persuasive one has taken shape in opposition to that
position. Based on the existence of alternate remedies for injuries for
which a plaintiff might seek damages under the state bill of rights, a
state action requirement, and the existence of sovereign immunity for
state constitutional violations, the argument that an implied remedy should
not be recognized seems to have swayed the New Mexico courts thus
far. However, the courts have not squarely considered the issue of whether
the statutory sovereign immunity of the Tort Claims Act precludes suits
for damages for constitutional violations.
Consequently, a recognition of a right to sue for damages for violations
of the New Mexico constitution can take three routes. First, the courts
could imply a cause of action, either by using state law or by analogizing
to Bivens. Implying a cause of action would require revisiting the issue
of whether the Tort Claims Act bars suits for damages based on constitutional violations. Second, the legislature could create a cause of
action. This could be done by amending the Human Rights Act to
authorize suits for damages for violations of the state constitution. Third,
the state constitution could be amended, specifically providing that individuals may sue for damages for violations of provisions of the con2

stitution . 01
If either of the second two options are pursued, the Tort Claims Act's
provision of immunity must be considered. The Act must either be revised
by the legislature to specifically exempt violations of state constitutional
rights from the immunity established in the act or the courts must revisit
the issue of whether the legislature's creation of immunity bars suits for
violations of the constitution.

201. Such an amendment could receive its genesis under the auspices of the Constitutional Revision
Committee.

